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Aviation, both domestic and international, is an industry that has tradi-
tionally been regulated throughout the world.' The 1980s, "however, wit-
nessed considerable changes in attitude towards economic regulation[,]
[c]hanges which transcended international borders and which covered virtu-
ally all aspects of economic activity. ' '2 Furthermore, in January 1993 the
* The author received his LL.M. from Northwestern University School of Law in May
2001 and is currently a Foreign Associate in the New York intellectual property group of
Reed Smith LLP. He would like to thank Dr. Helmut Gr6ner, Professor Emeritus, Univer-
sity of Bayreuth (Germany), and Shaul Avinor, candidate for S.J.D. (Doctorate) degree at
Northwestern University School of Law, for their friendly suggestions and helpful comments
during the research period of this article.
SEAN D. BARRETT, FLYING HIGH: AIRLINE PRICES AND EUROPEAN REGULATION 6 (Adam
Smith Institute ed., 1987).
2 See Kenneth Button & Dennis Swann, Aviation policy in Europe, in AIRLINE
DEREGULATION 85 (Kenneth Button ed., 1991) (claiming that "[i]n the Western [European]
economies the decade was characterized by a withdrawal of the state as privatization and
regulatory reforms were carried through").
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European Union ("E.U.") completed its transformation into a single Euro-
pean market.' The demand of this market, including almost 375 million
people and a gross national product exceeding $7 trillion, makes it the larg-
est domestic market in the world and consequently creates an enormous
challenge for the European airline industry with regard to communication,
transportation and commerce.4
Worldwide, in 1996, 800 airlines with more than 3 million employees
carried 1.35 billion passengers and 22.2 billion barrels of cargo.5 Through
2005 the expected annual rate of growth will be 5.5% for passenger and 7%
for cargo transport. For the E.U., the estimate is 4.5% for passenger and 5%
for cargo transport.6
Nevertheless, it remains uncertain whether the airline industry will be
profitable. For an industry that collectively lost $15 billion in the first few
years of the 1990s, the net profits of all scheduled airlines, which world-
wide rose from $4.5 billion in 1995 to $8.5 billion in 1997, have brought a
welcome change.7 Although in the past few years the airlines benefited
from rising net profits, "[t]he average consumer is paying 70 percent less
per passenger-mile in real terms than 20 years ago, and revenue per seat is
declining by an average of 2 percent a year."8 Consequently, air transport
was subject to some of the most important and dramatic changes in policy
and from a very highly regulated industry, it has gradually become more
market oriented as both national and international markets have been de-
regulated.9
While airline deregulation first started in the United States ("U.S.")
when Congress passed the "Airline Deregulation Act" in 1978,10 it took
3 See COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, COMPLETING THE INTERNAL
MARKET: WHITE PAPER FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL, COM(85)3 10
final (1985) (observing that the move towards a single European market had implications not
simply for trade and commercial policy but also for transport policy within the E.U. and put
pressure on the member states to integrate aviation within the overall legal framework of
E.U.'s policies).
4 RALPH H. FOLSOM, MICHAEL W. GORDON, JOHN A. SPANOGLE, INTERNATIONAL TRADE
AND INVESTMENT: IN A NUTSHELL 278 (2000); see also Helmut Gr6ner, Preface to
REGULIERUNG UND WETTBEWERB IM EUROPAISCHEN LUFTVERKEHR [REGULATION AND
COMPETITION IN EUROPEAN AIR TRANSPORT] at v (Helmut Gr6ner ed., 1989).
5 World Scheduled Airline Traffic Shows Continued Growth in 1996, ICAO NEWS
RELEASE PIO 16/96 (Int'l Civil Aviation Org., Montreal, Canada) Dec. 23, 1996.
6 Growth in Air Traffic to Continue. ICAO Releases Long-Term Forecasts, ICAO NEWS
RELEASE PIO 4/97 (Int'l Civil Aviation Org., Montreal Canada), Mar. 1997.
7 The Sky's the Limit, ECONOMIST, Mar. 10, 2001, at 3.
8 Id.
9
See GUNTER KNIEPS, DEREGULIERUNG IM LUFTVERKEHR [DEREGULATION IN AIR
TRAFFIC] 6, 1987 (arguing that the purpose of deregulation is to activate the existing com-
petitiveness in a market and thereby to stabilize its industry).
10 Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, § 10(a), 92 Stat. 1705, 1713
(1980).
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time for the member states of the E.U. to make progress towards liberaliza-
tion on a community-wide basis." At its beginning, liberalization in the
12
airline industry was only possible between pairs of countries. These bilat-
eral agreements "have both resulted in greater flexibility in the types of ser-
vices offered on the routes involved" and demonstrated that "excessive
instability need not arise under freer market conditions."13 The legislative
power to deregulate on a community-wide basis was the result of the Single
European Act,14 which the E.U. member states agreed to in 1986.1'
The objective of this article is to show the background of the airline
liberalization process in the E.U. and to evaluate its economic effects in
context of the global aviation market. To understand the pressures for
change and the forms that the changes are taking, it is first necessary to ap-
preciate why market regulation was thought important and how the U.S. de-
regulated its airline industry. Therefore, Section II of this paper will
analyze the different market structures in the U.S. and the E.U. In Section
III, the discussion will continue with a consideration of the effects of U.S.
airline deregulation. Section IV will give particular attention to the major
legislative actions of the E.U. creating new international aviation law. Sec-
tion V of this paper will examine whether liberalization in Europe has pro-
duced identical results to that experienced across the Atlantic. Finally, the
implications of the emerging European situation in the wider context of the
global aviation market and possible competitive concerns are considered in
Section VI.
II. REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL AVIATION
Regulation of international aviation originated at the Paris Convention
of 1919,16 which accepted that states have sovereign rights over the air
space above their territory. 7 This immediately involved national govern-
ments in the regulation of the airline industry, which was sought to suppress
Robert Esprrou, La liberalisation du transport adrien en Europe (The liberalization of
the air transport in Europe), REGARDS SUR L'ACTUALITt, February 1997, at 7.
12 Memorandum of the Commission of the European Communities, COM(79)311 final
(proposing liberalization on a Community-wide basis and holding the opinion that E.U. law
is applicable to bilateral agreements between the member states).
13 Button & Swann, supra note 2, at 95.
14 Single European Act, O.J.L 169/1, 2 C.M.L.R. 741 (1987) [hereinafter SEA].
15 The key feature of the 1986 Single European Act was the commitment to complete the
internal market by the end of 1992, Kenneth J. Button & Dennis Swann, Transatlantic les-
sons in aviation deregulation: EEC and US experiences, 37 ANTITRUST BULL. 207, 233
(1992).
16 See MAREK ZYLICZ, INT'L AIR TRANSPORT LAW 59 (1992).
17 BARRETT, supra note 1, at 7; see also Jurgen Basedow, Airline Deregulation in the
European Community-Its Background, Its Flaws, Its Consequences for E. C. -U.S. Relations,
13 J.L. & COM., 247, 248 (1994) (noting that "[u]nder international law, the starting point is
the territorial sovereignty of each state which extends beyond the surface to the whole of the
airspace above.").
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the threat of competition. 18 Regulators' motives for doing so varied from
"promoting nationwide air service to stabilizing the fledgling industry and
ultimately to protecting the financial interests of individual carriers." 19
Regulatory agencies all over the world were chartered to allow competition
while explicitly avoiding "unfair or destructive" competitive practices.2 As
with other economic regulation adopted during the period, this mandate re-
flected the widespread public skepticism of the consequences of unchecked
competition that had arisen in the catastrophic economic conditions of the
Great Depression."1
At the Convention on International Aviation, held in Chicago in
1944,22 the U.S. suggested global open skies for the new civil-aviation in-
dustry but, because of the wartime setting, almost all other nations identi-
fied aviation with national security and insisted on a regime of national
ownership and a system of designated flag carriers.23
To show the different starting-points of airline deregulation in the U.S.
and the E.U., part A of this Section will examine the regulation of U.S. air-
lines. Part B will then examine the major problems with regard to the regu-
lated E.U. aviation market.
A. Regulation of U.S. Airlines
In the U.S., formal regulation of passenger service dates from the Civil
Aeronautics Act passage in 1938.24 This Act established the Civil Aeronau-
tics Agency (reorganized in 1940 to become the Civic Aeronautics Board)
and authorized it to award individual routes to carriers, specify the fares and
ensure safe airline operating practices.25 The Act provided that an airline is
only permitted to serve a route when there was a public interest and when
the airline had the capacity to serve the requested route without causing fi-
nancial harm to any incumbent carrier.
26
In this context, the Civil Aeronautics Agency granted permanent au-
thority for existing airlines to serve routes over which they operated at the
time of the Act's passage.27 After "grandfathering" the route authority of
the 16 airlines operating in 1938, the Civil Aeronautic Board (hereinafter
18 Donald Pickrell, The regulation and deregulation of U.S. airlines, in AIRLINE
DEREGULATION 5, 6 (Kenneth Button ed., 1991).
'9 Id. at5.
20 KNIEPS, supra note 9, at 27.
21 Pickrell, supra note 18, at 6.
22 Convention on International Civil Aviation, December 7, 1944, ICAO Doc. 7300/6
art. 1.
23 Opening wider, A Survey ofAir Travel, ECONOMIST, March 10, 2001, at 7.
24 Civil Aeronautic Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-706, §2, 52 Stat. 973, 980 (1938).
25 Id.
26 Pickrell, supra note 18, at 6.
27 id.
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the "Board"), despite a 14% annual rate of growth in the airline industry,
precluded entry into service by new carriers. While most of its grants of
new route authority were apparently intended to strengthen financially weak
carriers by authorizing them to carry profitable traffic, even this "leveling"
policy was insufficient to prevent consolidation of the industry from its
original sixteen members to eleven that existed when the Board began to
deregulate the industry.29
In addition, the Board specified the fares, considering the public inter-
est on low fares as well as the profitability of the airlines and subsidized lo-
cal airline service connecting small communities with the cities served by
the original trunk carriers.30 Consequently, there was no price competition
between the airlines but instead competition on quality and service.31 De-
spite these efforts to restrain competition, the industry grew extremely rap-
idly in the postwar era, carrying well over ten times as many passengers
during 1970 as it had 20 years earlier. 32 This growth was fuelled by the sus-
tained economic growth the U.S. experienced during the postwar period,
coupled with the rapid pace of innovation in aircraft design, which reduced
carriers' cost sharply and thus allowed the Board to maintain stable fares for
almost two decades.33
B. The European System of Regulation
Until the passage of the "Single European Act" in 1986, one of the ma-
jor problems with respect to E.U. aviation was that no single market for
transport services existed.3 ' First, aviation itself can be divided into sectors
providing trunk, commuter, domestic and intercontinental services.35 Sec-
ond, geographical factors divide aviation markets across the continent.36 In
addition, the E.U. member states, each with its own approach to domestic
and international aviation policy, continued to exercise total sovereignty
over the control of their airspace.37 Consequently, there were almost 200
28 KNIEPS, supra note 9, at 28 (claiming that the Civil Aeronautic Board refused all 79 pe-
titions for new service between 1950 and 1974 and granted only 10 percent of the petitions
for new services of already established airlines between 1965 and 1978).
29 Pickrell, supra note 18, at 7.
30 
PAUL S. DEMPSEY & ANDREW R. GOETZ, AIRLINE DEREGULATION AND LAISSEZ-FAIRE
MYTHOLOGY 174 (1992).
3' KNIEPS, supra note 9, at 29.
32 Pickrell, supra note 18, at 7.
33 See id. (noting that fares remained virtually unchanged in actual dollars between 1950
and 1970, and actually declined by almost 50 percent in real or inflation adjusted terms).
34 See supra text accompanying note 3.
35 Button & Swann, supra note 2, at 90.
36
id.
37 Basedow, supra note 17, at 248 (noting that European air transportation was "interna-
tional in nature and therefore governed, in absence of E.U. legislation, by the rules of public
international law"); see also supra text accompanying note 17.
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bilateral agreements38 providing air transport services between the Euro-
pean countries and granting each other some of the eight "freedoms of the
air.' '39 The Chicago Convention of 194440 reached agreement on the first
(the right to fly over another country's territory) and the second (the right of
an airline to make a technical landing to, for example refuel, but not to pick
up passengers) freedom of the air.4 ' The third, fourth and fifth freedoms are
called commercial freedoms and were more or less granted to the other
member states of the E.U. through bilateral agreements.4 2 The third free-
dom relates to the right of an airline from a foreign country to put down
passengers, the fourth freedom allows airlines from foreign countries to
pick up passengers and the fifth freedom relates to the right of an airline
neither registered in the country of departure, nor in the country of destina-
tion to carry passengers between them.4 3 In international practice, combina-
tions of the third, fourth and fifth freedom rights are also granted in bilateral
agreements and therefore eight such freedoms of air can be identified."
As a result of the inability to reach agreements on a multilateral basis,
a system of very rigid sub markets emerged in European air transport with
major routes generally being shared between the national carriers of the
countries concerned.4 ' Fares normally had to be agreed upon both countries
involved and, in most instances, the capacity offered by each country was
limited to 50% with revenue-share pools.
46
The general view of the situation prevailing at the beginning of the
1980s is well summarized by the House of Lords Select Committee on the
European Communities, which claims that the main consequence of this
38 See Commission of the European Communities (1992) Air Transport Relations with
third countries: Communication from the Commission to the Council, COM(92)434 final at
10; see also Button & Swann, supra note 2, at 91 (observing that member states of the Euro-
pean Union maintain about 60 to 70 agreements each and the overall estimate of the number
of bilateral air services agreements worldwide is as high as 3000).
39 See Basedow, supra note 17, at 248 (claiming that "sovereignty entitles a state to grant
or reject the ability of a foreign airline to carry out certain operations on the surface or in the
airspace" and that eight such "freedoms of the air" can be identified).
40 Convention on International Civil Aviation, December 7, 1944, ICAO Doc. 7300/6
art ..
41 Peter Wolf, Die Grundregeln des Wettbewerbs im Flugverkehr [The Basic Rules of
Competition in Avaition] in REGULIERUNG UND WETTBEWERB IM EUROPAISCHEN
LUFTVERKEHR [REGULATION AND COMPETITION IN EUROPEAN AIR TRANSPORT], supra note 3,
at 12.
42 SVEN RECKEWERTH, ZUSAMMENARBEIT DER LUFTVERKEHRSGESELLSCHAFTEN NACH
EUROPAISCHEM UND U.S. - AMERIKANISCHEM RECHT [COOPERATION BETWEEN AIRLINES IN
EUROPEAN AND U.S.-AMERICAN LAW], at 43 (1993).
43 id.
44 Emmanuel .Duret, Evolution des statuts et des activitis des airoports dans le cadre de
la dirdglementation de Bruxelles, 381 TRANSPORTS 41, 44 (1997).
45 Button & Swann, supra note 2, at 90.
46 Wolf, supra note 41, at 12.
Consequences of E.U. Airline Deregulation
22:91 (2001)
system for allocating routes, fixing fares and pooling revenue was the vir-
47tual elimination of competition in fares on scheduled services.
III. DEREGULATION AND ITS EFFECTS IN THE U.S.
As a result of increased skepticism towards regulation, in 1975 the
Civil Aeronautic Board authorized new competition on a number of routes
for the first time since 1970, and allowed charter carriers to operate low-
fare service in direct competition with regulated carriers.48 In response to
the threat of increased competition from charter carriers and low fare
scheduled airlines, American Airlines applied, and was granted, authority to
offer discounts of up to 45% on fares.4  Emboldened by the results of this
experiment, the U.S. Congress enacted the Airline Deregulation Act in Oc-
tober 1978.50 The Act terminated the Board's jurisdiction over carriers'
route networks in three years and phased out its authority to set fares over a
five-year period.5
The U.S. airline industry experienced rapid transformation after the en-
actment of the Airline Deregulation Act. This transformation included op-
erational and marketing advantages associated with large hub-and-spoke
systems, continuing growth in the demand for intercity travel, and sharp
fluctuations in the costs of important inputs used by air carriers.52 Certainly
the most pronounced effect of deregulation was the decrease of prices for
air travel . Competition in the airline sector resulted in an average fare de-
cline of 40% in real terms on all routes compared to regulated fares until the
enactment of formal deregulation. 4 By 1986 the average fare per passenger
mile in the U.S. was 25% lower than regulated fares per passenger mile in
the E.U.
47 Button & Swann, supra note 2, at 93.
48 Pickrell, supra note 18, at 8.
49 See id. at 9 (noting that in the following year the Board allowed carriers to reduce fares
by as much as 70 percent and permitted all applicants seeking a new route to simultaneously
begin serving it).
50 Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, § 10(a), 92 Stat. 1713 (1980)
(codifying fare flexibility and liberal route award policy).
51 Luftfahrl Wirrwarr in Stufen [Air Traffic Confusion in Steps] WIRTSCHAFTSWOCHE
[WEEKLY ECONOMIST] 32, February 1, 1985. See also Pickrell, supra note 18, at 9 (noting
that Congress transferred the Board's remaining jurisdiction over airline mergers, consumer
complaints and other matters to the Department of Transportation, which transferred the au-
thority over airline mergers to the Department of Justice in 1988).
12 Id. at 10.
13 Id. at 29.
54 Fixing America's airlines, ECONOMIST, March 10, 2001, at 2 1; see also Steven Morri-
son & Clifford Winston, The Dynamics of Airline Pricing and Competition, 80 AM. ECON.
REv., 389, 390 (1990) (observing that "[deregulated fares amounted] to an average annual
saving to travellers of roughly $6 billion").
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Table 1.: Airfares in the US. and the E. U in June 1986 5'
Distance Average fare per passenger Average fare per passenger
interval,(miles) mile in, the E. U. (in U.S. $) mile in the U.S. (in U.S. $)








Another important "development in the U.S. airline industry during the
first decade of its deregulated operation has been the transition of individual
carriers domestic route systems toward hub-and-spoke configurations" de-
signed to enhance revenues at the expense of competitors. 56 After the en-
actment of the Airline Deregulation Act, trunk and local carriers were able
to develop route hubs, and in 1996, each carrier had begun to develop one
or more major route hubs at large, strategically situated airports.57 "In addi-
tion, ... each carrier has also attempted to integrate into its route network
service to small communities in the immediately surrounding area that are
too small to support acceptably frequent flights using its own jet aircraft."' 8
Soon after passage of the 1978 Deregulation Act, many formerly local
service airlines grew quickly and presented real competition. By 1984, the
number of airlines competing in national or regional markets had nearly
doubled from the nineteen that had been in operation immediately prior to
deregulation., 59 But in the openly competitive environment fostered by de-
regulation, some airlines have sought to realize these economies by merger
55 BARRETT, supra note 1, at 2.
56 See Pickrell, supra note 18, at 20 (noting that "the U.S. pre-deregulation route network
consisted of long-haul routes connecting major cities served by trunk carriers together with
localized networks connecting smaller cities").
57 Carrier dominance at selected airports in 1996: Delta held 74.02 percent of all slots in
Atlanta, United 47.06 percent in Chicago (O'Hare), Delta 92.49 percent in Cincinnati,
American 63.5 percent in Dallas, United 69.95 percent in Denver, Northwest 78.62 percent
in Detroit, Continental 77.19 percent in Houston, American 63.76 percent in Miami, North-
west 84.45 percent in Minneapolis, U.S. Airways 59.17 percent in Philadelphia and 89.61
percent in Pittsburgh, Trans World Airlines 67.45 percent in St Louis and United 59.76 per-
cent in San Francisco, Salomon Brothers, TRAVEL WEEKLY, November 28, 1996, quoted in
Ady Milman, The US. Airline Industry, 3 TRAVEL & TouRisM ANALYST, 4, 9 (1997).
58 Pickrell, supra note 18, at 22 (claiming that through joint marketing agreements with
regional airlines operating in the areas surrounding their route hubs, major carriers have
sought to incorporate connecting flights to these small communities into the networks of ser-
vice they can offer through their hub cities).
59 Id. at 17.
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or acquisition, rather than by internal growth. 60 Thus, during the 1980s, the
airline industry experienced massive consolidation and in the period be-
tween 1978 and 1988 alone, there were fifty-one airline mergers and acqui-
sitions.61 In 1995, the six largest U.S. airlines held a market share close to
82.7%.62
The experience of the U.S. in liberalizing its domestic aviation industry
demonstrated that the preceding period of extensive market regulation had
stifled the natural development of the market by leading to extensive fares,
inefficiency and limited consumer choice. In particular, regulation impeded
the natural growth of hub-and-spoke operations. Consequently, economies
of density and economies of scope could not be fully exploited. In sum-
mary, U.S. passenger boardings went up from 250 million in 1978 to 670
million in 2000, and the average fare was 40% lower in real terms.63 Inevi-
tably, the U.S. experience and its result in lower fares attracted the attention
of Europeans. The House of Lords Select Committee on the European
Communities criticized the differences in fares between the U.S. and the
E.U. stating that the interests of European consumers seem to be sacrificed
to the prestige of flag carrying national airlines and the protected environ-
ment in which they operate. 4
IV. AIRLINE LIBERALIZATION PROCESS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
To understand the legal bases of the airline liberalization process in the
E.U., this Section will first examine the legal framework of the E.U. and
consider the role of the different E.U. institutions with respect to the issue
60 See id. at 20 (arguing that many financially troubled airlines held valuable assets (for
example aircraft, takeoff and landing slots at capacity controlled airports) that made them
attractive takeover targets for other airlines).
61 See Barry E. Hawk, Airline Deregulation After Ten Years: A Need for Vigorous Anti-
trust Enforcement and Intergovernmental Agreements, 34 ANTITRUST BULL. 267, 276 (1989)
quoted in Jeff Mosteller, Comment: The Current And Future Climate Of Airline Consolida-
tion: The Possible Impact Of An Alliance Of Two Large Airlines And An Examination Of
The Proposed American Airlines-British Airways Alliance, 64 J. AIR L. & COM. 575, 578
(1999).
62 Bulletin de la Kredietbank, La liberalisation du transport aerien, November 1996,
PROBLtMES tCONOMIQUES 22, March 26, 1997; see also Greg Schneider, Airline Mergers
Worry Senators, WASHINGTON POST, June 15, 2000, at E01 (pointing out that according to
Senators Mike DeWine (R-Ohio) and Herb Kohl (D-Wis.) the consolidation of the U.S. avia-
tion market that is likely to follow the proposed United-U.S. Airways merger could leave the
industry with as few as three major airlines). In July 2001 the U.S. Department of Justice
blocked the proposed combination, citing fears that it would "reduce competition, raise fares
and harm consumers throughout the United States." Jim McKay, U.S. Airways-United
Merger Dead, PITTSBURGH POST GAZETTE, July 28, 2001. The Justice Department's position
is also likely to chill further speculation of mergers among other big airlines. See Jayne
O'Donnell, United, U.S. Airways Call Off Merger, USA TODAY, July 27, 2001.
63 Fixing America's airlines, supra note 54, at 21.
64 House of Lords Select Committee on the European Communities, quoted in Botton &
Swann, supra note 2, at 93.
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of liberalization. Part B will then analyze the application of the treaty es-
tablishing European Community ("EC Treaty") to a common air transport
policy and part C will examine the three legislative liberalization packages
which replaced the bilateral agreement system within the E.U.
A. The Legal Framework of the European Union
The E.U. is a supranational legal regime with its own legislative, ad-
ministrative, treaty-making and judicial procedures.65  On November 1,
1993, the Treaty on European Union 66 became operational and the tasks of
the E.U. thereafter included the creation of an economic and monetary un-
ion with emphasis on price stability. 67 Technically, the E.U. consists of
three treaties6 8 by the member states that establish three communities and
several amendments.69 In several important sectors the member states have
surrendered substantial sovereignty to the three communities that now have
the power to adopt regulations being directly applicable in all member
states. 70 E.U. law has replaced national law in many areas and the E.U. le-
gal system operates as an umbrella over the legal systems of the member
states.
The three founding treaties established four branches of government.
72
The European Commission (the "Commission") constitutes what the E.U.
members refer to as the authority enforcement agency. Besides legislative
and executive functions, the Commission has the duty to ensure that busi-
ness transactions are conducted in conformity with the relevant provisions
of the treaties.73 The Commission generally seeks to implement substantial
65 FOLSOM, GORDON & SPANOGLE, supra note 4, at 275.
66 TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION, February 7, 1992, O.J.(C 224) 1 (1992) [hereinafter
TEU] as amended by TREATY OF AMSTERDAM, October 2, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 1 (1997).
67 FOLSOM, GORDON & SPANOGLE, supra note 4, at 280.
68 TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY [hereinafter EEC
TREATY]; TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY (hereinafter
ECSC TREATY]; TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ATOMIC ENERGY COMMUNITY [here-
inafter EURATOM TREATY]. Under Article G(1) of the TEU as amended by TREATY OF
AMSTERDAM, the former European Economic Community is now called the European Com-
munity.
69 Entscheidung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court]
2134/92, 439 (F.R.G.) (holding in its judgment of October 12, 1993 that "the treaties estab-
lish an association of States for creating an ever-closer union among the peoples organized
into states of Europe, not a state based upon a-single European nation").
70 In contrast to "regulations", "decisions" are only binding for the specific addressee and
"directives" are only indirectly applicable through the implementation of the member states
(see Article 249 of the Treaty establishing the European Community, Nov. 10, 1997, O.J. (C
340) 3 (1997) [hereinafter EC TREATY]).
71 FOLSOM, GORDON & SPANOGLE, supra note 4, at 280.
72 Article 7 of the ECSC Treaty; Articles 189, 202, 211, 220 of the EC Treaty; Articles
107, 115, 124, 136 of the Euratom Treaty.
73 The Commission has the power to render opinions and issue recommendations to the
Council and was also granted the power to investigate alleged competition infringements by
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liberalization in the most heavily regulated areas and even threatens to use
all of its powers to see its initiatives implemented.74
"The second branch of the government is the Council of Ministers (the
"Council"), which is the primary legislative body in the E.U. and is respon-
sible for carrying out the objectives of the treaties., 75 "The Council does
not render a directive or issue a regulation without either a recommendation
or an advisory opinion from the Commission or the European Parlia-
ment.
7 6
The third branch, the European Parliament, historically played an advi-
sory role, but the Treaty of Amsterdam 7 significantly extended Parlia-
ment's co-decisional legislative powers.78 In contrast to the Commission,
the Parliament advocated a "go-slow" approach with respect to the issue of
airline liberalization and recommended allowing member states to delay the
implementation of liberalization measures up to fourteen years.79
The fourth governmental branch, the European Court of Justice, is re-
sponsible for the interpretation and application of the EC Treaty.80 It rules
on the application of the treaty provisions and also had to decide whether
the EC Treaty's competition rules apply to aviation. 1
With regard to the executive function, the national authorities generally
implement Community law. In some limited areas the Commission and the
Council perform executive functions themselves. 82 Only where E.U. insti-
tutions are vested with genuine legislative or executive power must the
Article 85(1) of the EC Treaty. PAUL S. DEMPSEY, LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY IN
INTERNATIONAL AVIATION 97 (1987).
74 See id. at 101 (the Council of Ministers, discussed in the next paragraph, observes the
Commission's strategy in achieving progress towards the development of a common air
transport policy within the Community).
75 See id. at 98 (the Council is comprised of representatives from the various member
states who theoretically act in accordance with the instructions given to them by their respec-
tive member governments).
76 See id. (the European Parliament consists of elected representatives of the citizens of
their respective states).
77 Treaty of Amsterdam, October 2, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 1 (1997).
78 FOLSOM, GORDON & SPANOGLE, supra note 4, at 281; see also PAOLO MENGOZZI,
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW FROM COMMON MARKET TO EUROPEAN UNION 302, 1992 (argu-
ing that even the mechanisms introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam do not provide for a
true two-chamber legislative system consisting of two equal Houses).
79 DEMPSEY, supra note 73, 98 (1987).
80 FOLSOM, GORDON & SPANOGLE, supra note 4, at 290.
81 Specifically at issue was whether the French government's prohibition of the sale of
airline tickets below a floor constitutes a violation of the provisions in the EEC TREATY,
which require the free movements of goods among the member states, Joined Cases 209-
213/84, Ministre Public v. Asjes, 1986 E.C.R. 1425; see infra Section IV, Part B.
82 Thus, arts. 81 through 86 of the EC Treaty and Council Regulation (1968) 17/62, J.O.
(C75) 3 (which organizes the procedures for the enforcement of the EEC antitrust rules) en-
dow the Commission with the necessary executive powers, Heinrich Kirschner, The Frame-
work of the European Union under the treaty of Maastricht, 13 J.L. & COM. 233, 238
(1994).
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Court of Justice enforce Community law. In other fields national authori-
ties applying Community law remain subject to the jurisdiction of their na-
tional courts.83
B. Application of the EC Treaty to Aviation
The absence of air transport regulation in the EC Treaty may be ex-
plained by the close proximity of the six founding states.84 While Articles
70 and 71 of the EC Treaty mandate a common transport policy, Article
80(1) of the EC Treaty expressly confines the scope of the provisions to
transportation by rail, road and inland waterway. Under Article 80(2) of the
EC Treaty the Council decides whether these provisions may be applied to
sea and air transportation.85 This statute raised doubts as to whether ship-
ping and aviation were covered by the EC Treaty at all. 6 But a succession
of judgments by the Court of Justice between 1974 and 1986 made it clear
that other Articles of the EC Treaty did apply to aviation. 87 After the Nou-
velles Frontires decision,88 Europe's national carriers saw that their price
cartel was in jeopardy and attempted to convince their respective national
governments, and the Commission, to enact a block exemption for the avia-
tion market from E.U. competition regulations. 89 In order to acquire a block
exemption for their carriers under Article 85(3) of the EC Treaty, the mem-
ber states had to pay a political price in terms of further secession of sover-
eignty rights in aviation matters to the Community. This has been
interpreted as their final approval to a deregulation of the European aviation
market.90
83 id.
84 The six founding states of the European Community are Belgium, France, Germany,
Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, Basedow, supra note 17, at 251.
85 Article 80 (2) of the EC TREATY requires a right of each member state to veto any
measure in shipping or aviation matters.
86 JACQUES NAVEAU, L'EUROPE ET LE TRANSPORT AERIEN 224 (1983).
87 Case 167/73, Commission of the European Communities v. French Republic, 1974
E.C.R. 359 [1974] (holding that the obligation under Article 2 of the EC TREATY to establish
a common market refers to the whole of the economic activities in the Community); Joined
Cases 209-213/84, Ministre Public v. Asjes, 1986 E.C.R. 1425 [1986] (hereinafter Nouvelles
Fronti~res) (holding that civil aviation, including the tariff system decided upon IATA, is
subject to the competition rules of Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty (as in effect 1986
(now Articles 81 and 82)).
88 Id.
89 Basedow, supra note 17, at 253.
90 Id. With respect to the different criteria of Article 81(3) of the EC Treaty, see ULRICH
GEERS, DIE GRUPPENFREISTELLUNG IM EG-KARTELLRECHT [THE GROUP EXCEPTION IN EC-
ANTITRUST LAW], 36-39 (2000).
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C. E.U. Air Transport Liberalization
Given the existence of over 200 bilateral agreements between the E.U.
member states and the political compromise necessary to agree on deregula-
tion rules, the measures, which were to be adopted for integration, could not
replace the existing treaties altogether.91 The Community took its first step
into the field of scheduled air services regulation in 1987 by enacting the
first air transport liberalization package which included four legislative
acts.92 Two Council Regulations discussed the application of competition
rules to air transport.93 Furthermore, a Council decision eliminated capacity
limitations between the airlines.94 Most importantly, however, Community
Directive 87/601 EEC set forth criteria and time limitations for the approval
by national agencies of tariff applications made by the airlines. 95 Conse-
quently, this Directive increased the predictability and international uni-
formity of administrative decisions and created so-called "zones of
flexibility."
96
This package, along with the second liberalization package, which en-
tered into force in 1990, did not set up a system of airline licensing and
market access, but merely loosened the constraints of the bilateral agree-
ments between member states.97 Most significant seems to be Regulation
2342/90 from 1990, which enlarged the "zones of flexibility."98 In contrast,
discount and deep discount fares could be fixed within a range of 80% to
94% and 30% to 79% of the reference fare.99 The introduction and gradual
extension of such zones of price freedom were shaped by the "zones of rea-
sonableness", also a characteristic of the transition period in the early days
of American airline deregulation. 00
Only the third European air transport liberalization package of 1993
replaced the bilateral agreement system with a multilateral system within
91 Id.
92 Romina Polley, Defense Strategies of National Carriers, 23 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 170,
172 (2000).
93 Council Regulation 3975/87, 1987 O.J. (L 374) 1; Council Regulation 3976/87, 1987
O.J.(L 374) 9.
94 Council Decision 87/602, 1987 O.J. (L 374) 19.
95 Council Directive 87/601, 1987 O.J. (L 374) 12.
96 See Basedow, supra note 17, at 257 (noting that "If airlines applied for tariffs that were
fixed between the lower and upper margins, their applications could not be dismissed").
97 Council Regulation 2342/90, 1990 O.J. (L 217) 1 (concerning airfares); Council Regu-
lation 2343/90, 1990 O.J. (L 217) 8 (discussing market access); Council Regulation
2344/90, 1990 O.J. (L 217) 15 (regarding application of the EC Treaty to certain categories
of agreements and concerted practices).
98 See Council Regulation2342/90, supra note 97, at 1 (interpreting an airline's filed
economy class fare as a tariff of reference allowing price cuts and a rise of five percent in
both directions for regular fares).
99 Council Regulation 2342/90, supra note 97, at 1.
100 Basedow, supra note 17,at 257.
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the European Union. 101 The third package essentially consisted of three
Council regulations: one on the licensing of air carriers,'0 2 one on market
access, 10 3 and one on fares and rates. 0 4 Under the air carrier licensing regu-
lation, licenses are still granted by national authorities)0 5 However, they
are now subject to a set of common rules for air operator's licensing and
airlines in all member states and are therefore licensed under similar condi-
tions. 106 These conditions include the establishment of the airline in the li-
censing member state, the majority control by nationals of member states,
the financial viability of the company, insurance to cover liability in the
event of accidents, and an air operator's certificate giving evidence of the
company's aeronautical fitness. 1° ' "The licensing of an airline does not
provide, in itself, free access to all route markets." While previous law in
many member states provided for tight administrative control of market ac-
cess under a test of public convenience and necessity, the Community has
lowered entry barriers on interregional air services and compelled member
states to accept multiple designations.'0 8 In addition, capacity sharing was
altogether terminated and the fifth freedom rights were gradually introduced
within the E.U.'0 9 As a result of these measures, most entry barriers were
removed and European airlines have access to all air transport routes within
the Community, including cabotage."o
In summary, since January 1, 1993 airlines in all E.U. member states
are licensed under similar conditions, entry barriers have been lifted to the
extent that market access is essentially free and rate making in intracommu-
nity air transport is now unrestricted.
V. EFFECTS OF THE E.U. DEREGULATION
This Section will assess whether European deregulation has been suc-
cessful so far. Part A will discuss whether there are still obstacles to liber-
alization within the E.U. Part B will then examine the Commission's power
towards the continued application of bilateral air transport agreements be-
tween E.U. member states and third countries.
'o' Polley, supra note 92, at 173.
102 Council Regulation 2407/92, 1992 O.J. (L 240) 1.
103 Council Regulation 2408/92, 1992 O.J. (L 240) 8.
104 Council Regulation 2409/92, 1992 O.J. (L 240) 15.
105 Council Regulation 2407/92, supra note 102, at 1.
106 Polley, supra note 92, at 173.
107 Council Regulation 2407/92, supra note 95, at art. 4,5,7 and 9.
108 Basedow, supra note 17, at 256; see also Polley, supra note 92, at 173 (claiming that
the common air carrier license system does not apply to air traffic between the E.U. member
states and third countries where bilateral air service agreements still apply).
109 Council Regulation 2408/92, supra note 103,at 8.
110 See Polley, supra note 92, at 174-5 (noting that in April 1997, cargo was liberalized as
the last of the implementation of a single aviation market in the E.U.).
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In general, liberalization in the E.U. has not led to dramatic changes,
like those in the U.S., following deregulation of air transport. Nevertheless,
there were notable changes following liberalization." First, there was
above average total growth in air transport in the E.U., particularly in the
light of the fact that part of the liberalization process was during an eco-
nomic recession."2 Second, the number of routes operated in the E.U. in-
creased from 490 in 1992, to 520 in 1996, primarily because of the
introduction of new non-stop connections of former charter operators that
took up scheduled services.' 3 With respect to the creation of new airlines,
market dynamics have been most visible. Over three years after the imple-
mentation of the third aviation package of 1993, eighty licenses have been
granted and eighty companies were created, while sixty have disap-
peared. 4 As far as airfares are concerned, the impact of liberalization is
still difficult to assess, but Table 2'15 shows that on routes where two or
more airlines were operating in 1996, airfares have generally been much
lower, than on routes without competition.
Table 2: Airfares on E. U. Routes With Competition in 1996
Competition routes in km Airfares for Business Class
London-Amsterdam (374 kin) £ 230
London- Frankfurt (634 kIn) £ 294
London - Zurich (723 kin) £ 306
London- Nice (1032 kin) £ 413
London-Palma (1347 km) £ 330
Table 3: Airfares on E. U Routes Without Competition in 1996
Non-competition routes in km Airfares for Business Class
Frankfurt-Amsterdam (364km) £ 377
London-Hamburg (718 km) £ 442
London - Geneva (746 km) £ 366
Paris - Madrid (1043 km) £ 722
Madrid - Rome (1338 km) £ 708
.. Id. at 175.
112 Impact of the Third Package of Air Transport Liberalization Measures, COM (96)514
final at 3. Overall traffic increased by 8.1 percent in 1994 (the first year after the implemen-
tation of the third liberalization package), the biggest rise for 15 years (leaving aside the 9.1
percent following the drop in traffic recorded in 1991 during the Gulf War); this trend con-
tinued in 1995 with growth reaching 6.1 percent. Id. at 20.
1 Polley, supra note 92, at 175. In 1996, 30 percent of the Community routes were
served by two operators, 6 percent by three operators or more, and 64 percent of the routes
were still operated by monopolies, id.
14 Polley, supra note 92, at 175.
"' British Midland, Clearing the flight path for competition, June 1996, quoted in Barry
Seal, Memorandum of the European Parliament regarding COM (96) 514 final, January 21,
1998, at 11.
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In addition, an impressive number of promotional fares have developed
and the share of the passengers traveling scheduled flights with tickets at
reduced prices has changed from 60.5% in 1985 to 70.9% in 1995.116 Tak-
ing into account that the share of the charter market accounts for approxi-
mately 50% to 55% of the total market, it is estimated that today 85% to
90% of the passengers travel at reduced prices. 1 7 In summary, the essential
effects of E.U. airline deregulation are flexible airfares and additional routes
within Europe.
A. Obstacles to Liberalization
Despite the ensuing liberalization, there are still a number of factors
preventing the air transport market in Europe from achieving its full poten-
tial.' 18 First and foremost, intensified competition in the E.U. is in conflict
with the dominance of partly state owned national carriers in almost every
member state.119 Due to the state ownership of the national carrier, member
states, particularly during the early phase of liberalization, were not willing
to implement the liberalization measures and employed tactics such as de-
laying granting licenses to other non-state owned airlines. 120 Furthermore,
the national airline has tax advantages, privileged access to landing slots at
airports and sometimes partakes in the airport's allocation of slots to com-
petitors. 121 Therefore, airlines do not compete at equal levels in the deregu-
lated European market; and unless this distortion of competition can be
overcome, airlines will maintain their territorial share of the European mar-
ket pursuant to former national markets.
122
116 Impact of the Third Package of Air Transport Liberalization Measures, supra note
112, at ii. However, these seats are often accompanied by restrictions with regards to sched-
ule flexibility and are available only for a limited number of seats.
117 Nevertheless, airfares for cross-border flights tend to be still higher than domestic air-
fares on comparable distances, Polley, supra note 92, at 176.
'18 Commission of the European Communities, supra note 106, at 22.
119 Member states which still owned more than 50 percent of the equity stock of their na-
tional carriers in 1995 were Greece (100 percent of Olympic), France (98.6 percent of Air
France), Italy (86.4 percent of Alitalia), Ireland (100 percent of Air Lingus), Spain (99.8
percent of Iberia), Portugal (100 percent of Air Portugal) and Germany (51.4 percent of Luf-
thansa), DIETER ROGALLA & KATRIN SCHWEREN, DER LUFTVERKEHR IN DER EUROPAISCHEN
UNION (AIRTRANSPORT IN THE EUROPEAN UNION) 35 (1994).
120 Polley, supra note 92, at 179.
121 While most airports are state owned, the national airline may also have a monopoly on
the check-in and check-out procedures for passengers, the transportation and distribution of
luggage, the towing and maintenance of aircraft, supplies and forwarding services. Basedow,
supra note 17, at 264.
12 2 Id.; see also Loyola de Palacio, Deputy President of the European Commission, in
Bruselas Insiste en las Fusions Entre las Aerolineas Europeas [Brussels Insists on Needfor
Mergers Between European Airlines], EXPANSION, October 19, 2001 at 4 (insisting that
European airlines must embark on a consolidation process in order to be competitive with
U.S. airlines).
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Apart from the scarcity of resources, there is no legal ground for the
transfer of national carriers to the private sector because the E.U. law itself
does not contain a legal obligation for member states to privatize public un-
dertakings.1 23 Nevertheless, there might be a possibility for the Commis-
sion to promote transfers to the private sector under the authority of Article
86(3) of the EC Treaty. 124 According to the Court of Justice, the separation
of regulatory functions and commercial activities is necessary in order to
guarantee the parity of treatment for private competitors of public undertak-
ings. 125 The court's decision could furnish the legal basis for the efforts of
the Commission to prevent national carriers from being granted privileges
by their regulatory authorities. 126 Insofar as national airlines will lose these
privileges, their competitive advantage will be diminished and, conse-
quently, their public owners will transfer airline operations to the private
sector. 127
Another obstacle to liberalization is the continued practice of state
grants of aid to airlines in the E.U. 128 Under Article 92 of the EC Treaty,
aid which is granted by a member state and distorts competition is incom-
patible with the theory of the common market insofar as it affects trade be-
tween member states. 12 In its state aid decisions, the Commission has tried
to impose conditions on granting state aid to ensure that state aid is used for
restructuring instead of being used for gaining a competitive advantage.
130
123 To the contrary, Article 295 of the EC TREATY provides that "this treaty shall in no
way prejudice the rules in Member States governing the system of property ownership".
124 Under Article 86(3) of the EC TREATY, the Commission acting on its own and without
consultation with, or approval by the Council, is not only entitled to make decisions in single
cases, but it may also address directives to member states.
125 In French Republic v. E.C Commission, 1991 E.C.R. 1223,5 C.M.L.R.552, the Court
of Justice rejected the member states' plaintiffs' attack on the Commission's repeal of na-
tional postal monopolies for the import and service of telecommunication terminal equip-
ment, and separate organization of commercial and regulatory functions of postal
undertakings.
126 Polley, supra note 92, at 178 (claiming that many airlines "have a close relationship to
the regulatory authorities).
127 Basedow, supra note 17, at 264.
128 Airlines that have received state aid since 1991 include Air France (3.15 billion Euro);
Iberia (1.4 billion Euro); Olympic Airways (1.1 billion Euro); Air Portugal (0.55 billion
Euro); and Air Lingus (0.25 billion Euro). NEUE ZORICHER ZEITUNG [NEW ZURICH
NEWSPAPER], February 11, 1995, quoted in Rogalla & Schweren, supra note 119, at 41. For
losses resulting from the four-day closure of American airspace after the September 11, 2001
terrorist attack, the European Commission announced that E.U. governments would be al-
lowed to grant limited compensatory aid to airlines. EC Authorizes Limited Airline Aid,
AVIATION DAILY, October 11, 2001, Vol. 246, No.8, at 1.
129 Basedow, supra note 17, at 265.
130 Polley, supra note 92, at 179. The Commission requires that the beneficiaries of cost
reductions ensure that these privileges are necessary for the airline to operate profitably, that
the recipient makes commitments not to expand their fleets, which means that the aid is not
used to acquire other airlines or act as a price leader in airfares and that the individual gov-
ernments will not grant further aid during the restructuring plan.
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Compliance with the Commission's conditions, however, is difficult to su-
pervise, and from a competition law perspective, it would be best if no state
aid were granted at all. 3.
One of the most significant obstacles to successful liberalization is air-
port congestion resulting in slot allocation problems, because the absence of
attractive slots is the main barrier to entry for competitors on high-density
routes.'32 Since national carriers own all the attractive slots and have supe-
rior access to airport facilities, they have a competitive advantage under the
current structure. 133 Council Regulation No. 95/93 preserves grandfather
rights if the carrier concerned uses at least 80% of the slots during a season
and permits slot exchanges between carriers on different routes at coordi-
nated airports. 3 4 Only withdrawn and newly created slots are put into a
pool, of which 50 percent are allocated to new entrants.135 Empirical stud-
ies on Regulation No. 95/93 have come to the conclusion that most slots at
airports are still held by the former national carriers and that there will al-
most never be enough attractive slots in number and time in the pool to ac-
commodate new entrants.136 One proposal suggests free trading of slots is a
favourable approach but the U.S. experience has shown that slots are more
valuable for an incumbent airline than for a new entrant and therefore barri-
ers of entry have increased following slot trades rather than diminished.
3 7
Another proposal suggests that airlines holding more than a certain percent-
age of slots at a fully coordinated airport could be obliged to surrender a
proportion of those slots to the scheduling committee.' 38 This option could
generate a sufficient number of attractive slots to be available to new en-
trant airlines, however, it seriously affects the position of the flag carriers
and might impair their ability to compete globally.
39
In summary, regulatory bias rooted in public ownership, and the infra-
structure of airport congestion are the most important structural obstacles
for the liberalized single aviation market.
131 Id.
132 Commission of the European Communities, supra note 112, at 22.
'33 Polley, supra note 92, at 179.
134 Council Regulation 95/93, 1990 O.J. (L 14) 1 (regarding common rules for allocation
of slots at Community airports).
135 Id.
136 Polley, supra note 92, at 180.
137 Peter Morrell, The Single Market Review, Impact on Services, 13 AIR TRANSPORT 13,
14(1997).
138 Karel Van Miert, Competition Policy in the Air Transport Sector, Address Before the
Royal Aeronautical Society (March 9, 1998), quoted in Polley, supra note 92, at 181.
39 Id. (claiming that the approach of the Commission is still open, while Directorate
General IV opposes trading in slots, Directorate General VII seems to advocate the trading in
slots approach).
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B. Commission's Power Towards Bilateral Agreements
Another serious problem for the liberalized aviation market is the con-
tinued application of bilateral air transport agreements that protect the na-
tional carriers of the contracting parties by capacity restrictions in air traffic
between the E.U. member states and third countries. 140 Aside from their di-
versity, the agreements with third countries also distort competition within
the E.U., since some airlines operate on protected markets while other cari-
ers face competition.14 1 Apparently, the Commission's proposal to directly
conduct negotiations with third countries 142 aroused criticism from Europe's
national carriers, who played an influential part in the bilateral negotiation
process in the past.1 43 In its Opinion 1/94 the Court of Justice held that re-
gardless of Article 113 of the EC Treaty,144 the Community has no power,
yet, for negotiation on international transport agreements with non-member
states.145 Nevertheless, the Court of Justice concluded that member states
would lose their right to assume obligations with nonmember countries
when common rules, which could be affected by those obligations, come
into being. 46 In order to get the Commission's approval for recently con-
cluded bilateral air transport agreements with the U.S. and to avoid further
proceedings, the member states gave the Commission a mandate limited to
regulatory aspects of air transport. 47 However, the more controversial sub-
jects of access, traffic rights, designation and fares are to be addressed in a
second phase, and the Commission will need a further mandate from the
Council before it can commence negotiations on these subjects.148 As a re-
140 1d. at 178.
141 Commission of the European Communities, supra note 112, at 22.
142 Air Transport Relations with Third Countries: Communication from the Commission
to the Council, COM (92) 434 final at 50.
143 G. Porter Elliot, Antitrust at 35,000 Feet: The Extraterritorial Application of United
States and European Community Competition Law in the Air Transport Sector, 31 GEO.
WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 185, 228 (1998) (noting that member states will remain reluctant
to relinquish sovereignty in external air transport matters if the Commission cannot promise
a minimum level of protection of their flag carriers. The risk that free competition might
lead to airline bankruptcy is unacceptable to national governments).
144 Article 113 of the EC Treaty confers the exclusive power for negotiation of trade
agreements with nonmember states on the Community.
145 Court of Justice, Opinion 1/94, 1 C.M.L.R. 205 (1995), on the question of Community
competence in connections with agreements comprised in the GATT Uruguay Round.
146 On this basis, the Court held that competence might be shared between the Commu-
nity and its member states and that they therefore had a duty to cooperate; however, in the
field of aviation, in which there are few areas in which the Community enjoys exclusive
competence, the obligation of the member states to cooperate is limited, John Balfour, A via-
tion Relations between EC Member States and Other States, 2 EUR. FOREIGN AFF. REV. 97,
105 (1997).
147 See id. (such as slot allocations, computer reservation systems, code-sharing, airport
services, environmental standards, state aid and ownership limits).
148 Mark Gerchick, Assistant Secretary at the U.S. Department of Transportation, Re-
marks at the Conference of the European Law Institute of the University of Trier in Frank-
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sult of the refusal to delegate more negotiating powers for aviation to the
Commission, U.S. carriers obtained fifth freedom rights between European
points through bilateral agreements with the single member states, while
European airlines cannot enjoy the equivalent rights to serve city pairs in
the U.S.'
49
VI. AIRLINES' STRATEGIC RESPONSES TO LIBERALIZATION
European aviation is part of a much larger aviation market and as such
it is influenced by, but also influences, changes in the world of aviation. 50
The implementation of the third aviation package has increased competition
and European carriers have already made major efforts to improve their
competitiveness by reducing costs and increasing productivity. 1 As size
becomes an important factor in a more liberalized aviation market, Euro-
pean airlines have begun to seek ways of maximizing economies of scope
and of density.'52 Some of them have taken the classic route of direct take-
overs, (for example British Airways' takeover of British Caledonian), but
international air services between E.U. member states and other countries
are still determined by bilateral agreements.
5 3
These so-called "Open Skies" agreements often require the designated
national carriers to be owned and controlled by nationals of the countries
involved and include prohibitions on the carriage by foreign carriers." 4
Whenever bilateral agreements are undermined by an acquisition, national
carriers would loose advantages granted to them, for example antitrust im-
munity.' Consequently, airlines have attempted to strengthen their market
positions by concluding partnerships, co-operative arrangements or alli-
furt (May 1996), quoted in Balfour, supra note 146, at 103 (arguing that "the U.S. considers
discussions on the regulatory aspects to be unnecessary and inappropriate and would not be
willing to negotiate with the E.U. unless matters of access and traffic rights were also on the
table").
149 Opening Wider, supra note 23, at 7 (arguing that the U.S. has picked off European
markets one by one while stopping foreigners from picking up passengers at more than one
American city).
150 Botton & Schwan, supra note 2, at 118.
151 Karel van Miert, The transatlantic and global implications of European competition
policy, Address Before the North Atlantic Assembly Meeting (February 16, 1998), available
at http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/speeches/text/sp1998_054_en.html.
152 Botton & Schwan, supra note 2, at 118.
153 Id.
154 Joanne W. Young, Airline Alliances-Is Competition at the Crossroads?, 24 AIR &
SPACE L. 287, 288 (1999).
115 Philippe Chappatte, The Alliance Between SAS and Lufthansa-a Model for Future
Cooperation Between Airlines in Europe, Address Before the European Air Law Association
Eight Annual Conference (November 8, 1996), quoted in 10 EUROPEAN AIR LAW
ASSOCIATION CONFERENCE PAPERS 53, 55 (1997); see also Polley, supra note 92, at 193-94.
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ances.'56 These are mainly designed to achieve fleet rationalization, expan-
sion and rationalization of network structure, greater exploitation of cost-
side economies of scale, and reduction of costs through joint purchasing
and joint marketing.
157
In a strategic alliance, the partners to the alliance seek to develop a
single network to sell to their respective customers. 58 In consequence, alli-
ances enable airlines to obtain the efficiencies and benefits normally linked
with mergers and acquisitions. Today there are 580 airline alliances involv-
ing 220 airlines. 59 This is a startling number considering that ten years ago
alliances were virtually unknown, and it has only been five years since the
U.S. Department of Transportation approved the first alliance agreement
with antitrust immunity for Northwest and KLM.160  Although the scope
and nature of these alliances differ from equity exchange, code sharing,
block booking arrangements to joint marketing agreements and joint
fares, 161 there is a tendency towards deeper alliances involving co-operation
on all aspects of airline business, amounting to virtual merging of alliance
members' activities. 162 As consolidation in the U.S. might lead to three or
four main carriers, 163 it is estimated that major alliances may also result in
three or four major network competitors on an international market such as
U.S.-Europe. 6 4
156 Jost Stragier, Current Issues Arising with Airline Alliances, Address Before the 11 th
Annual Conference of the European Air Law Association (November 5, 1999), available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/speeches/text/sp 1999678_en.html.
157 id.
158 Chapatte, supra note 155, at 54 (claiming that strategic alliances usually involve route
and schedule coordination and planning, code-sharing, joint fare planning and budgeting, re-
ciprocal frequent flyer arrangements, joint marketing, advertising, and distribution and sales
of the alliance routes).
19 Huddling together, A Survey ofAir Travel, ECONOMIST, March 10, 2001, at 8.
160 Young, supra note 154, at 287.
161 Trevor French, Global trend in Airline Alliances, 4 TRAVEL & TOURISM ANALYST, 81,
83-86 (1997).
162 Van Miert, supra note 151 (noting that "the four transatlantic alliances establish an
even closer co-operation by consulting each other on commercial aspects of their business
like prices, capacities, frequencies, schedules, common purchases, relations with travel
agents, ground handling and Frequent Flyer Programs").
163 Fixing America's Airlines, supra note 54, at 21 (arguing that the United Airlines take
over of US Airways and the American Airlines take over of TWA would put pressure on
Delta Airlines to merge with Continental so that three mega-carriers would dominate the
market).
'64Let fly, A Survey of Air Travel, ECONOMIST, March 10, 2001 at 14(claiming that the
number of major alliances will be as many as there are large U.S. partners, which guarantees
a footing in the U.S. because a foreign airline cannot get around the Jones Act that limits
foreigners to owning 25 percent of voting shares in an U.S. airline); see also Young, supra
note 153, at 289 (noting that Oneworld's most important partner British Airways and
KLM/Northwest have already announced their intentions to form competitive global alli-
ances).
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Table 4: Global Market Share of World Air Traffic in June 2000165
International Most Important Partner of Percentage of Total Revenue Pas-
Airline Alliance Alliance senger Kilometers of Alliance
Star Alliance United Airlines, Lufthansa, 21.3 %
Singapore Airlines
Oneworld British Airways, American 16.4 %
Airlines, Cathay Pacific,
Iberia
Skyteam Air France, Delta Airlines, 9.5 %
Continental
Wings KLM, Northwest 6.4 %
Other Other airlines (partly part- 46.5 %
ner in smaller alliances)
Airline alliances therefore raise fundamental questions about their ef-
fect on competition in air services. 166 The effect on competition of airline
alliances depends upon the nature of the allied networks, in particular, an
alliance can significantly reduce competition on overlapping non-stop
routes and overlapping connecting routes where the allied airlines were
once main competitors.167 Moreover, "alliances between airlines operating
hub-and-spoke networks will normally enhance demand for the network" as
a whole and increase the market power of the network, which entails the
risk of rendering still more difficult new entry into the network's markets. 16
8
In summary, multiple connecting options by airline alliances clearly
benefit many consumers, however, there is credible evidence to suggest that
some major alliances may have anticompetitive effects in certain markets.
Given a real potential for amalgamation of airlines into a few mega-airlines,
165 Huddling together, supra note 159, at 8; see also Jean-Francois Le Grand, Aviation
Civile Et Transport Afrien [Civil Aviation and Air Transport], Avis pr~sent6 au nom de la
Commission des Affaires 6conomiques de l'Assembl~e Nationale [Memorandum presented
on behalf of the Commission on Economic Affairs of [French] Parliament, StNAT No 87,
November 20, 1997, at 21 (estimating the global market share of possible future Airline Al-
liances).
166 See Vagn Sorensen (Senior Vice President of SAS), The Alliance between SAS and
Lufthansa: A model for future cooperation between airlines in Europe, 10 EUROPEAN AIR
LAW ASSOCIATION CONFERENCE PAPERS, 48, 50 (1997) (contesting that "it was considered a
basic requirement that the routes of the two carriers [SAS and Lufthansa] between Scandina-
via and Germany be coordinated to eliminate the earlier competitive element").
167 See Stragier, supra note 156, at 1 (arguing that even where the two networks do not
overlap in the markets they serve, the alliance can have serious anti-competitive effects by
reducing or eliminating competition on the hub-to-hub route(s) between the networks).
168 id.
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it is reasonable to ask how the U.S. government and the European Commis-
sion have responded to these competitive concerns.
A. U.S. Antitrust Enforcement
"Viewing the competitive landscape it appears that two of the most
significant impediments to competition in the age of alliances is the power
of the alliance partners to exclude other carriers from entering markets be-
cause of pre-existing barriers or barriers created by the alliance itself.'
169
Under U.S. antitrust law, depending on the scope of entry barriers, a market
share of 50% or more could be the basis for a finding of attempted monopo-
lization, and a market share of 75% is considered sufficient to find monop-
oly power. 170 Nevertheless, "U.S. antitrust enforcement in recent years has
largely focused on efficiency issues and the benefits to be derived from car-
rier coordination.' 17 ' Thus, until the order in December 1997 on the
American/TACA alliance, the U.S. Department on Transportation 172 had
imposed very few restrictions on alliances and allowed participants in most
cases to consolidate operations and coordinate fares even in point-to-point
markets where no other direct competition existed. 173  As far as interna-
tional airline alliances are concerned, the "U.S. takes the position that it has
antitrust jurisdiction over foreign activity that has a substantial effect on
U.S. commerce even if the challenged conduct occurs entirely outside the
U.S., 74 In consequence, collaborative management techniques of interna-
tional alliances that might be forbidden under U.S. antitrust law must be
granted immunity from antitrust prosecution if they are to proceed.'
"Such immunity serves to partially override the substantial inefficiencies of
the existing bilateral aviation system, and to allow airlines to link their op-
erations closely so that they can develop virtual global aviation systems."
169 Young, supra note 154, at 292.
170 See U.S. v. American Airlines, 743 F.2d 1114 (5th cir. 1984) in which the court held
that a joint market share of 76 percent of the monthly enplanements at Dallas would be suffi-
cient to create a monopoly.
171 Young, supra note 154, at 291 (noting that the U.S. has generally adopted the view
that competition over gateways by various alliances would promote or at least maintain
competition).
172 The U.S. Departments of Transportation and Justice are jointly responsible for polic-
ing competition in air transport. French, supra note 161, at 99.
173 In the American/TACA order, which was issued on 31 December 1997, the U.S. De-
partment of Transport expressed its concern about the potential new entry in the small Cen-
tral American markets dominated by American and its proposed Alliance partners and
imposed principal restrictions on the marketing coordination and the exclusivity clause that
would prevent the TACA carriers from also entering into alliances with other U.S. carriers.
Young, supra note 154, at 291.
174 id.
175 French, supra note 161, at 100.
176 Charles A Hunnicutt, Aviation Liberalization: a U.S. View, 28 INT'L Bus. LAWYER 58,
60 (2000).
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Therefore, antitrust immunity has become the U.S.'s major bargaining chip
in securing liberal "open skies" bilateral agreements, particularly in
Europe. 7 7 However, the United States has granted antitrust immunity only
after finding that a proposed alliance would be pro-competitive, pro-
consumer and consistent with U.S. aviation objectives.178
B. Application of E.U. Competition Rules to Air Transport
The wave of alliances between airlines operating across the Atlantic
has led to a number of important competition investigations. "Since these
alliances affect E.U. markets for air transport, the Commission has an obli-
gation to ensure that they comply with the competition rules set out in Arti-
cles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty.' ' 179 The role of the E.U. competition rules
in the aviation sector is to prevent regulatory barriers from being replaced
by anticompetitive agreements (such as market sharing, price fixing etc.)
between airlines, or abusive behavior by a dominant carrier, which could
significantly reduce or eliminate the benefits of liberalization.
180
The E.U. takes a different view of competition analysis than the U.S.
authorities even though the underlying laws, Articles 81 and 82 of the EC
Treaty and Section 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, are similar.18 1 "Thus, while
the U.S. generally sees efficiencies resulting from an alliance as a benefit,
the E.U. tends to see efficiencies as a potential abuse of a dominant position
and takes a more protectionist attitude towards new entrants."'
82
Regarding the application of Articles 81 an 82 of the EC Treaty to air
transport within the E.U., the European Commission 83 can now fully im-
plement the competition rules in the deregulated aviation market. 84 This
contrasts with air transport between the E.U. and third countries, where the
177 See id. The Netherlands, Austria, Belgium, Germany and Switzerland signed open
skies bilaterals in return for alliance anti-trust immunity.
178 id.
179 Stragier, supra note 156.
180 J.F. Pons, address before the Chicago Beyond Open Skies Conference, December 5-7,
1999, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/speeches/text/sp1999679_en.htm].
181 In general Article 81 (1) of the EC TREATY aims to prohibit "arms length" competitors
from agreeing between themselves to prevent, restrain, or distort competition and is roughly
analogous to the prohibition against restraints of trade in Section 1 of the U.S. Sherman Act.
See Treaty Establishing European Community 37 I.C.M. 79 (1998) entered into force May 1,
1999; Article 82 of the EC Treaty prohibits dominant position to the prejudice of competitors
or consumers and is more encompassing than monopolization as offense under Section 2 of
the Sherman Act. See also FOLSOM, GORDON & SPANOGLE, supra note 4, at 321.
182 Accordingly, the European Commission is apparently concerned about the impact of
combined frequent flyer programs and CRS displays of code sharing flights. See Young, su-
pra note 154, at 291.
183 FOLSOM, WALLACE GORDON & SPANOGLE, supra note 4, at 322 (noting that the terms
of Articles 81 and 82 of the EC TREATY are enforced, in the first instance, by the European
Commission).
184 Pons, supra note 180.
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Commission does not yet have the same type of investigation and enforce-
ment powers it has in other industries to enforce these rules. 8 5 Until the
Council adopts secondary legislation, the Commission can only use the re-
sidual powers granted to it by a transitional provision of the EC Treaty to
ensure the application of the E.U. competition rules in cooperation with the
competent authorities in the E.U. member states. 8 6 The procedures in-
volved are cumbersome and they do not allow the Commission to enforce
decisions recording an infringement of the rules, nor to grant an exemption
or to impose fines upon infringing companies.'8 7 The Commission has pro-
posed the necessary legislation to the Council of Ministers enabling the
Commission to apply Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty extraterritori-
ally. "'88 "Up to now, the Council has not yet adopted the Commission's
1997 proposals." '189
In summary, while international airline alliances are subject to U.S. an-
titrust jurisdiction, E.U. competition rules regarding aviation do not yet ap-
ply with respect to air transportation to and from third countries.
VII. CONCLUSION
Airline deregulation in the European Union has been a major step to-
wards a fully liberalized aviation market. In consequence, Europeans bene-
fit from many discount fares and a network of additional routes within the
E.U. However, a single aviation market has not yet been accomplished be-
cause deregulation alone is not a sufficient prerequisite for intense competi-
tion. The regulatory bias rooted in public ownership is a structural
problem, which can only be solved by selling the national carriers to private
owners. As far as the infrastructure of airport congestion is concerned, the
Commission will have to find a way to ensure that sufficient slots are avail-
able for new entrants on monopoly or duopoly routes in Europe.
185 Stragier, supra note 156.
186 Case 66/86 Ahmed Saeed Flugreisen and Silver Line ReisebUro v. Zentrale Zur
Bek'mpfung Unlauteren Weitbewerbs, 1989 ECR 803 (the European Court of Justice has
made clear that in the air transport sector an implementing regulation has only been intro-
duced regarding air transport between Community airports. However, this does not deprive
the E.U. competition rules of all effects with regard to air transport between Community air-
ports and non Community airports, by confirming that in such cases the Commission still has
the residual powers conferred by Article 85(1) of the EC TREATY to investigate cases of sus-
pected infringement, in cooperation with the competent authorities in the member states).
See also Balfour, supra note 146, at 107 (noting that the Commission recently opened inves-
tigations under Article 85(1) of the EC TREATY into existing alliances between North-
west/KLM, Star Alliance and Oneworld).
187 Stragier, supra note 156.
188 See generally Commission of the European Communities, Application of the competi-
tion rules to air transport, COM(97)21 8 final.
89 Stragier, supra note 156.
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One central goal to be pursued by the E.U. in the next phase of liber-
alization must be the application of Community competition law on interna-
tional airline alliances in order to ensure that these alliances do not rule out
the opportunities for real competition. At the same time, cooperation be-
tween the respective antitrust authorities in the E.U. and the U.S. must be
strengthened in an attempt to avoid conflicting decisions and to establish
multilateral guidelines to assure uniform treatment of airline alliances. Car-
riers who follow these guidelines would then be able to understand what
would be required to gain approval for the alliance.
Finally, as long as third countries maintain bilateral transportation
agreements with each member state, they will weigh the comparative ad-
vantages of the individual bilateral agreements as an alternative entry door
leading into the single European aviation market. Therefore, the competi-
tion between regulations that are contained in bilateral agreements, and
their discriminatory nationality clauses, call for Community action which
should lead to the transfer of negotiation power from the single member
states to the Community.




